that the course of cultural evolution, like that of bio-evolution, is strewn with the wreckage of ingeniously functional dinosaurs. This does not deter us from inquiry into the func tional relationships which account for the adaptive radiations of extinct forms. Low-energy agrarian cultures are undoubtedly doomed, not because they are negative-functioned, but because there is selection in favor of more efficient techno-environmental and techno-economic arrangements. Bennett renders a disservice by trying to cram my article into a synchronic functionalist mould. He is baffled by my suggestion that the "inefficiencies of the system" are "part of its functioning." \V'hy is this so difficult to comprehend? In comparison with "tribal" cultures, the ecosystem of contemporary India is a radical evolutionary advance. (How else shall we describe the huge population?) In comparison with high-energy industrial systems, on the other hand, the whole ecosystem seems drastically inadequate in terms of the survival and well-being of its human com ponents.
The CA* discussion which followed my article emphasized the possibility that the ecosystem in question is deteriorating. It seems obvious that the efficiency of the whole system is in decline as a result of population pressure. There are too many people and hence too many cattle. The wretchedness of both the human and cattle populations intensifies our ex pectation that evolutionary modifica tions in the traditional ecosystem are about to take place. This does not mean, however, that the system as it stands, even with all of its conse quences in terms of hunger, disease, and suffering, has ceased to be functionally superior to the more primitive systems from which it emerged, I do not subscribe to the theory that cultural evolution occurs only through the advent of otherwise insoluble crises. Most evolutionary modifica tions consist of the replacement of functioning features by better-func tioning ones, If Bennett shares this view of evolution, then he must take aCCOunt of the remaining strengths of the positive-functioned aspects of the Indian cattle complex, Applied an thropologists have the professional obligation to be certain that their intended innovations are functionally superior to what they are trying to replace, It would be convenient if the cattlc complex could be regarded as a product of silly superstitions and ignorant mismanagement. Under such circumstances anything that would work would be better than nothing. Indeed, many "experts" seem to think that this is the case, .My article refutes that point of view. Although I certain ly did not intend to become involved with the question of development priorities, I can see how the article might be useful in that connection. It might help to create an understanding of the vast scope and intricate nature of the modifications which are re quired if the survival and well-being of the Indian people is to be ad vanced in fact as well as in theory,
To and did not accept the evolutionary model that they proposed (Kortlandt and Kooij 1963) . In supporting Hall's position we will consider first the nature of tool-using, then Kortlandt's evidence, and finally Kortlandt's evolutionary "dehumanization" hy pothesis.
Interest in hU,man evolution and the wa y modern man uses tools has distorted the way in which manipula tion of objects by non-human primates is described and evaluated. We agree with Hall's assessment of the evidence: -that object-using to a very limited extent occurs in a variety of animals and is not necessarily a mark of particular intelligence. Oakley (1954) I This paper is part of a program on prima[e behavior, supported by United States Public Health Service Grant MH 8623. regime to make cattle more directly related to cash agrarian economy." Since my article was not concerned with cultural change (but rather with the relation between ideology and ecosystem)} any such "suggestion" is strictly Bennett's responsibility, But since he makes applied anthropology the fulcrum of his critique, I wish to disown his proposal whether or not my article suggested it to him, His program strikes me as just the kind of desultory tinkering-a result of tOO much expertise and too little general theory-which is associated with the recently confirmed increase in the gap between the developed and under developed nations, Bennett says that my paper "illustrates some of the dangers of applying microcosm theory to macrocosms." Let us ignore the erroneous association between eco systems, tribal studies, and microcosms. (The concept of ecosystem is not a product of tribal studies, and studies of ecosystems are usually rather macro cosmic compared with studies in which a single species or population is the focus.) The "experts," it seems, are interested, not in the kind of overview which is contained in my article, but in the local variation in cattle manage ment, How can we expect anything more than local results from local measures? What my article should have suggested, if anything, is that it is too late for patchwork. A whole new ecosystem is needed. India, contrary to Bennett's advice, needs both steel and more food, It will get neither, it seems to me, if its population continues to expand and our aid program con tinues to operate without a general theory of cultural evolution, reviewed much of the evidence for tool-use and came to the conclusion that it is skill, not merely use, which characterizes man. In spite of the fact that all primates have hands and feet adapted for grasping and manipula tion and use the hands a great deal in feeding, the chimpanzee is the only primate aside from man in which any substantial item of the diet is obtained by the use of a cool (Goodall 1965) .
Object manipulation by non-human primates is limited almost exclusively to agonistic displays, and it only causes confusion to label the object used in the dlsplay a «tooL" For example, in addition to the gestures, postures, running, vocalizations, etc" of display, the gori!1a may pull grass or other vegetation and throw it about (Schaller 1963) ; ·chimpanzees may pull off branches and wave them or pick up rocks and fling them (Goodall 1965) ; orangs drop branches (Schaller 1961)j and many species of monkeys will jump on or shake branches. In a display the point seems to be to appear as large (hair erec tion), fierce (facial gesture and posture), and noisy as possible. A handy branch or, more rarely, a stone, may be used to enhance the effect. The use of the object as a part of display is very different from any thing that we normally think of as tool-use. It is the confusion of the object-in-display category with tools. in the sense of weapons, which con fuses the thinking on tool-use in monkeys and apes.
It is not useful to use a category like "throwing" without a careful statement of the situation in which the throwing occurred. In. display, throwing is part of a sequence of integrated behaviors, and intepre tation depends on understanding the function of the sequence as a whole. If the majority of what has been called «tool-use" in non-human pnmates is use of an object tn agonistic display, then it is easy to see why tales of throwing and clubbing are almost useless as a source of data. The results from a questionnaire would only be useful if the questions were framed by someone appreciative of the necessity of functional analysis and answered by those who had a substantial understanding of the whole context of the behaviors they describ ed. Hall and Kordandt disagreed com pletely on what constitutes useful in formation on tool-use. \Y/e agree with the position taken by Hall.
Kordandt's reliance on information ootained from zoos raises the question of what constitutes useful evidence on tool-use. Behaviors evolved under free· ranging conditions and the adaptive meaning of behaviors can be appre ciated only in their natural setting. A cage can hardly be regarded as a natural setting, and we have never seen a zoo cage that provided the kind of objects which may be used in displays under natural conditions. Though many chimpanzees and ~oril1as have been observed in zoos, tn neither species was the nature of even ts in the agonistic display seen until they were observed in the wild, Por example, chest·beating was described as an isolated action rather than as part of a sequence of behaviors. Behavior in a zoo shows that an animal is capable of doing certain things, but it gives virtually no information on meaning or fre quencies of normal behaviors. For example, since thro~ing objects is part of the normal agonisti.c displays of chimpanzees, it is not surprising that this behavior occurs in zoos, If it is rewarded, the behavior may become frequent, and, since feces are usually the only object available in the cage, some chimpanzees become efficient throwers of feces. It would be a mis take to conclude from this, however, that feces-throwing is a part of the normal display of free-ranging chim panzees. The frequency with which sticks are used in agonistic display can be increased by making sticks easily available, as Kortlandt did. Under certain circumstances chimpanz~es will throw sand, if that is all that is available. None of these situations can be used as evidence that chimpanzees of times long past used feces, sticks, or sand more than contemporary chim panzees; they cannot provide support for the theory that the ancestral apes were more human in their behaviors than the contemporary ones. In each of these situations, man has so limited the environment and -arranged the rewards that a kind, or frequency, of behavior appears which is very dif ferent from anything observed under natural conditions, A parallel example is that while rhesus monkeys can be trained, as in India, to dance in a bipedal position, this does not mean that the ancestors of rhesus monkeys were dancing bipeds! In summary, we think that Hall was right to restrict the evidence he used to those accounts that described tool-use in context under natural conditions, and we believe that Kort landt's confusion comes from reliance on questionnaires, behavior in cap ti vity, and the accounts of untrained observers.
Quite aside from the Hall-Kortlandt controversy, viewing object-use-in· agonistic-displa y as a behavioral category helps to resolve two kinds of questions. The first question is why tool-use, which seems so obviously adaptive, did not evolve in other lines of primates. Almost all of what has been called tool-use is either an artih.ct of conditions Il1 zoo or laboratory or is object-in-display. The function of the object-in'-display is to increase the effect of the display; since actually hitting is usually not the objective, there is no selection for more accurate aiming, or for more suitable branches-in short, no selection for an effective tool. The second question is how human tool-using evolved. Re cognition of the display function of objects suggests that the answer may involve both this use and the use of objects for economic purposes and from display (Washburn, CA 4, 492) . The kind of display given by chim panzees might lead, over many thousands of years, to both use of clubs and accurate throwing of stones, based on repeated experiences that actual hitting was even more effective than display alone. This theory gets around the problem mentioned by Mech (CA 7, 200 ) that a weapon used ineffectively would be worse than none at all. Agonistic displays are effective even if the object used in the display does not hit. The object is only a part of the behavior sequence and may actually be an unimportant part. The use of objects in displaYl particularly the kind seen in chim panzees, is the general kind of re petitive situation in which small changes may be rewarded that is most likely to lead to evolution. This is why we find Goodall's rich accounts of the beha vior of chimpanzees so interesting. Far from being de humanized, chimpanzees give us the closest parallels to the way of life of our ancestors.
There is one final point which we think must be stressed, although neither Hall nor Kortlandt did so. Detailed similarity in a behavior, such as throwing, is only possible if the underlying structures are similar. The action in man and chimpanzee looks similar because the anatomy of the arms and trunk, and especially that of the shoulder (Grand 1964 ) which allows overhand throwing, is the same. Overhand throwing is impossible for most primates because they are quadrupedal. It was accounts of overhand throwing in primates 10 which it is anatomically impossible that first made us very suspicious of the usefulness of casual accounts of throwing. From a structural point of view, underhand scooping and throw ing is very easy for the knuckl"e-walk ing chimpanzee and gorilla, being only a minor change from the usual swing of the limb in walking. In a quadru pedal monkey, such as a baboon, the hand is jlaced on the object palm down an the object is tossed forward in an action very close to normal locomotion; scooping underhand is difficult and overhand throwing im possible. Progress in understanding manipulation of objects by primates will come from the detailed analysis of what the animals do, from study of the underlying structures that make the ,actions possible, and from seeing these actions performed under natural conditions. Both experiments and field observations are needed, and we are a long way from understanding even such an apparently sirn.ple category as tool-use. Similarly, in my opinion, it is ir relevant to argue against my experi mental approach on the grounds that I made sticks.a vailable, or more sticks available, for the intimidation display by chimpanzees. In the wild, there are ala ways some sticks available. More over, in the wild, intimidating chim panzees do break off branches and small trees, and do use these as inti midation tools, as I had observed al· ready several times during the 1960 fieldwork. The essential issue is not the methodological question of whether or not one is allowed to make sticks (more) available. In actual research it is facts, rather than methodology, that count. Methodology is only talking about the techniques to obtain facts, but the ultimate aim remains the facts, nOt the talking. The facts are, briefly:
I} Chimpanzees in· captivity use sticks and other objects as agonistic tools against small animals very rare ly, even if they are readily available; and chimpanzees in the wild have never been observed to do so, even if pleney of sticks were at hand. (In all my experiments with living and dead reptiles, birds, small and medium sized mammals this has never oc curred.) 2} Both in captivity and in the wild, chimpanzees do use sticks and other objects occasionally as inti mid a tion tools against conspecifics and, in areas in the wild where they are not toO shy of man, against humans. 3} An extremely fierce use of inti midation tools and a much higher performance level were elicited when chimpanzees, in experiments both in captivity and in the wild, were con fronted with a stuffed leopard and, in captivity, a living leopard.
4}
In the wild, forest-dwelling chimpanzees used sticks, tree-trunks, etc. only as intimidation tools against animated and non-animated stuffed leopards; their motor performances were relatively poor; they rarely selected for big sticks j and the leopard was never hit with an object. (Six trials with large bands of chimpanzees were conducted.) Conversely, in a trial in captivity with a group of three adult savanna-dwelling chimpanzees which had been captured at an almost adult age (and so must have known leopards as predators in the wild) and which were kept under semi-wild condtions, the apes selected only very big sticks, used them mostly as true fighting weapons with almost human motor patterns. and hit the stuffed leopard four times with the sticks, ending up with a tremendous "con summatory blow." Furthermore, the only case in which a highly reputed fieldworker (Millot of Paris) is report ed to have been hit by a throwing chimpanzee in the wild was reported from a savanna habitat.
S} Circumstantial evidence based upon vocalizations suggests that savan na-dwelling chimpanzees in the wild do attack live wild leopards, at least if they are in a band.
6} Half-grown chimpanzees born in a zoo, which had rarely or never shown any throwing or clubbing activity and which had never seen a large Feline, almost ~mIl)ediately start ed to use intimidation roo Is when a leopard or half-grown tiger was shown to them, but their aim and perform ance level was extremely poor. A real· ly good aim and a high performance level in throwing and clubbing is achieved in zoos only if the apes have plenty of space. Thus the response as such is instinctive, but the aiming has to be learned.
7} Motivation analysis, both in zoos and in the wild, demonstrated that all these behaviors occur only when the apes are in a strongly ambivalent state of conflict between fear and agression. Analysis of the motor patterns indicated that throwing, clubbing, in cipient weapon-use, etc. are extensions or derivatives of the general intimida tion displays which are typical of primates.
All these points demonstrate that the zoo evidence and the wildlife evidence parallel one another. This justifies us, for the time being, in extrapolating from points (4) and (6) to predict that sa vanna-dwelling chimpanzees in their natural habitat, when they are in a large band, will use large sticks, tree trunks, etc., as true and effective fight ing weapons against leopards, whereas forest-dwelling chimpanzees will use any sticks at hand as intimidation tools only. Such a prediction allows us to set up a working hypothesis and to undertake to test the hypothesis ex perimentally under wildlife conditions. (Two of my collaborators are at present on their way to Africa to try and conduct the crucial experiment, and, if possible, also [0 obtain com parative data on this issue for dif terem subspecies in the same type of habitat.)
By means of the above summary of the present state of OUf research on agonistic tool use in chimpanzees, I have attempted to demonstrate how immensely important zoo observations and experimentation can be in stim ulating and evaluating fieldwork, and conversely. It is in this respect that \'(fashburn and Jay seem to dis agree with me most fundamentally. To them, zoo data appear to have no value at all and should, therefore, be ignored. They seem to be unaware that Kordandt and Kooij's paper was JUSt one step in a long-term re search program that includes not only behavioral, but also ecological, field work and palaeol1tological aspects (Kortlandt 1965 (Kortlandt , 1966a (Kortlandt , 1966b de Bournonville n.d.) . In such a com prehensive program no kind of data can be neglected.
For example, it was circumstantial evidence from zoos that caused me to suspect as early as 1957 that our con temporary savanna-dwelling chimpan zees might be, and their ancestors might have been, to some extent, carnivores-an assumption later con firmed by Goodall (1963) and perhaps corroborated by Pei (1957) . Similarly, it was the evidence of "savanna adapted" behavior in zoo chimpanzees and in the wild that induced de Bournonville and me to look for chimpanzees in areas hundreds of miles north of the rain forest belt-a search which (through the kind help of the Services des Eauxs et For~ts of the countries involved) led to the discovery of scattered and relict populations .at the northern edge of the Isoberlinia Sudan ian vegetation belt of savanna!> and dry forests, in the south of Senegal and Mali, the north of the Ivory Coast, and the northwest of the Central African Republic I cannot understand Why \Vashburn and Jay show such a lack of apprecia tion of zoo data and experimentation· Perhaps as anthropologists they are interested primarily in naturalistic descriptions and evolutionary aspects, whereas the scope of interest of students of animal behavior includes also motivational research, ontogeny of behavior patterns, the "innate vs. learned" problem, etc. The design of DeVore's book (1965) and particularly its last chapter (by \Washburn and Hamburg) clearly indicate the restrict ed focus of interest of such anthro pology-centered work. Perhaps another reason is that most American zoos are not as good as most European ones. In the United States, even a good zoo still tends to be considered as some SOrt of circus entertainment, rather than as a scientific institution. ~lhat· ever the case, it may be helpful to enumerate some of the advantages that a good zoo can offer: 1) In a zoo, one has an opportunity to get familiar with the ways and expressions of the animals at close distance and to learn to estimate ages before fieldwork starts. Both Goodall and I profited much from such intro ductory work.
2) In a zoo, one can study the emotional expressions of related animal species from a comparative point of view, analyze the underlying motivations, and measure their mean ing and effect in social intercourse. The work by van Hooff (n.d.) provides a good example.
3) In zoos, all animals belonging to One and the same order are normally kept in the same type of cages or compounds. Consequently, the differ ences in beha vior observed between different families, genera, and species mUSt be attributed as a rule primarily to differences in phylogenetic adapta tion to different habitats. This is why zoo people who know many species from everyday observation are often more aware of ecological habitat factors than fieldworkers who have studied only one, or very few, species in only one, or very few, localities. For example, the fact that, in cap tivity, most apes and monkeys belong ing to predominantly terrestrial species (including chimpanzees!) are panicked as a rule by the sight of a snake, whereas the predominantly or ex clusively arboreal species show curiosi ty, though some caution, towards it virtually proves that the risk of a snake bite is very much· greater on the ground than in a tree, in spite of the fact that the tree snakes include the most poisonous species (Antonius 1938 39; Kortlandt, unpublished) . Inciden tally, the spider monkeys are an excep tion and therefore suggest that some South American arboreal snakes are more likely to bite than the Old World ones. This example shows how certain ecological data can be collect ed in a zoo within a quarter of an hour or so, and at no cost, whereas their collection in the wild would re quire many, many years and an enormous sum of money. Furthermore, in the wild it would be virtually im possible to determine to what extent the differences in behavior beween, for example, the chimpanzee and the orangutan may be attributed to geno typic or to phenotypic factors, because the vegetational and «physiognomic" characters of their habitats are quite different.
4) In good zoos and laboratories, the animals can be kept under controlled conditions, and records of their individual life histories are avail able. Consequently, one can study many aspects which can virtually never be studied in the wild. For example, the experiments mentioned above, in which half-grown apes which had never, or hardly ever, shown any agonistic tool-use, were confronted with a leopard for the first time, are absolutely inconceivable under wild life conditions. 5) In poorly furnished zoo environ ments, one may observe ecologically irrelevant behaviors (e.g., vacuum activities) under conditions that throw new light on the function of such behaviors under natural conditions. Conversely, in well-equipped com pounds, the behavior catalogue may be richer than in the wild. For example, in Hamadryas baboons, Kummer and Kurt (1965) observed in the wild only two behavior patterns which they had not seen in captivity, but saw in cap tivity nine behavior patterns that had not been observed in the wild. "The main tendency of the zoo colony was the enrichment of social beha v.ior" (Kummer and Kurt 1965 :14) .
All these points obviously refute Washburn and Jay's position on the inadequate of zoo evidence. Further more, in Hamadryas baboons at least, Hthe composition of one-male-groups described by Zuckerman and observed in the Zurich Zoo was a replica of wild groups, down to the smallest detail," and "relative frequencies of behavior categories in the sex-age classes were mostly the same in the zoo and in the wild" (Kummer and Kurt 1965:14) . All this does not imply, of course, that fieldwork is unnecessary. It does imply, however, that field work should be complemented by zoo and lab work, and conversely, to com pensate for the inadequacies and in validities of each.
With regard to some of Washburn and Jay's other points I may be quite brief:
I think it is premature to state that "the chimpanzee is the only primate aside from man in which any sub stantial item of the diet is obtained by the use of a tool." Zoo evidence suggests that wild capuchin monkeys may depend on tools to crack certain types of nuts. Incidentally, it is worth remembering that such a modest creature as the ant lion (Myrmeleon CVRRENTANTHROrOLOGY Symposium of the Zoological Society, LondO, organization and totemlstic practices of historically observed hunting and gathering peoples. In any case, clan totemism was at one time much more widespread than it is today.
Tokarev does not deal at length in his review with certain questions which seem important to me. One of these is, why should totemism be a fantastic reflection of social relations rather than a realistic reflection? Other related questions are, granted that totem ism is a fantastic reflection of kin relations, in what ways does it distort an objective image of these, and why, and how does this distorted image become accepted and establish ed in the life history of individual members of the society? A simple appeal to the-power of tradition does not seem sufficient, since without some active force supporting the distortion the tradition should vanish in a few generations.
The American anthropologist Ed ward Sapir once remarked, «It is strange how little ethnology has con cerned itself with the intimate genetic problem of the acquirement of culture ---. 1966a. On tool-use among primates. CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 7:215-16. ---. 1966b . "Experimentation with chim panzees in the wild." AbstraclS, inter· national PrimatoJogicll1 Society Confer· ence, Frankfort am Main, Jul" 1966 . 1966c . by the child" (Mandelbaum 195\ , 595) . One non-anthropologist who did concern himself with this problem in a certain fashion was the psychiatrist Sigmund Freud, especially in his work Totem and Taboo (1952) . Freud noticed the spontaneous occurrence in many modern children of behavior, fantasies, phobias, and dreams about animals which closely resembled the totemistic beliefs and practices which he had read about in the ethnographic literature. He further concluded that the symptoms of these children in volving animals originated in the emotional conflicts of the children concerning their family members, principally their parents. The reason the conflicts were not expressed overt ly was that it would be tOO frightening for the child to face the full extent of his resentment of his parents and his demands upon them in view of his necessary dependence on their good will and care. Children therefore con structed animals as secret or uncon scious representatives of the parents and displaced much of "'the conflict OntO these animal symbols. Totemism, Freud postulated, arose out of a similar social-emotional conflict which formerly extended into adult life in
